Hofmann The decline of the old sports car world championship
15.03.2012
M it is great joy that the sports car community is celebrating its 17th birthday. March 2012: After two decades of bitter opposition between the Le Mans organizer ACO and the world motorsport authority FIA, a new joint sports car world championship (World Endurance Championship, WEC for short) will be revived in Sebring. Almost 20 years have passed since Mauro Baldi and Philippe Alliot won the last race of the old World Sports Car Championship on October 18, 1992 in a Peugeot 905 Evo 1B at Magny Cours.
High hopes are associated with the restart
However, if you take a look back into the past, you will learn to understand how quickly a world championship can become the pawn of power struggles and jealousies. The downfall of the old sports car world championship took place at a dramatic pace: in 1989, all the major manufacturers of the old Group C era were still represented at the Le Mans 24h race - Jaguar, Mercedes, Porsche, Aston Martin, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda. And barely four years later, the World Cup was flat. Those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it.
Of course there are significant differences between then and now, but unfortunately there are also obvious similarities. The introduction of Group C in 1982 was considered to be a similar epoch-making break as the energy-based LMP regulations planned for 2014: Group C was planned as an efficiency formula that limited the amount of energy supplied to the racing cars from the outside. In the legendary 1000-kilometer races, for example, the vehicles only had 600 liters of petrol available.
Today, as then, the new technical regulations sparked the interest of the major manufacturers: Porsche was the first to jump on the bandwagon with the 956, Ford and Lancia followed, and over the following years more and more European and Asian manufacturers moved in after. The goals of the Group C regulations were quite comparable to the approaches of today: The focus of the engine engineers should be steered away from maximum performance towards better efficiency, while in the predecessor of Group 6 the power-to-weight ratio was the central point of the regulations .
Over 50 prototypes at the 24h race in Le Mans
The former Le Mans winner and engineer Paul Frère was chosen by the ACO, the manufacturers of theTo make the new package attractive: Saving gasoline should be viewed positively and rewarded with sport - motorsport as a marketing tool. The desire of the manufacturers was aroused, the success and public awareness increased continuously. In 1988 more than 50 prototypes started at the 24h race in Le Mans, the entry list still leaves you frozen in awe: five Silk-Cut Jaguar XJR-9s, two Nismo R88Cs, two Toms-Toyota 88Cs, three works Mazda 757s, three Porsche 962C, plus ten private Group C Porsches and 20 Group C2 cars with reduced-speed engines, comparable to today's LMP2 class - what a starting field!
But success attracts envious people, money cutters and politicians. Three months after the Jaguar victory in June 1988, Max Mosley, then FISA manufacturer's representative, announced to a group of journalists in London that the FIA wanted to exert greater influence on the World Sports Car Championship in the future. Six months ago we heard similar statements from FIA President Jean Todt at the ACO press conference in Le Mans. In order to underpin the new claim to leadership, a bold plan was trumpeted at the time: As early as next year, according to Mosley, 3.5-liter naturally aspirated engines should be used in the World Cup, and from 1991 onwards, all prototypes would have to have these Formula 1-derived engines go to the start.
In racing, you don't learn from history
The journalists were shocked by the abrupt change of direction, ditto the manufacturers. Mosley's explanation was interesting and instructive: “With these engines, manufacturers can become active in Formula 1 and sports car racing. The 3.5 liter engines became the new world formula. That is exactly what the manufacturers want. ”It was less than two years ago that the same nonsense was sold to us again, back then under the keyword Global Race Engine (GRE). Regardless of whether it's TW, rally, Le Mans or Formula 1 - 1.6-liter turbo engines should be used across the board in all series from 2012. This idea is now off the table, but the process shows that no one in racing seems to learn from history.
The bad influence - or the claim to leadership - the FIA led to negative developments in other areas as well. The pompous FIA President Jean-Marie Balestre announced in October 1988: “Our goal is to bring sports car racing to the same level as Formula 1, and as quickly as possible.” So the World Cup calendar for 1989 inflated to 12 races, the manufacturers were to register for the entire season. At first, the factory teams seemed to pull along. Jaguar, Mercedes, Aston Martin, Mazda, Nissan, Toyota and Peugeot committed to realigning the World Cup. But the private teams, the backbone of the World Cup, were already groaning about the costs: The private teams estimated the costs at 400,000 marks per race. Porsche even pulled itthe plug immediately: Norbert Singer was assigned to series production, the factory team locked. Peugeot was the only manufacturer to actively work towards the 3.5-liter formula, while the other competitors feasted on the promised blooming landscapes, but the deadly stake was already in the flesh of the sports car world championship.
Peugeot was promised the Le Mans victory
Time leap into 2012: Of course Primarily economic reasons were decisive for Peugeot's sudden withdrawal from the World Cup. But some voices also claim that Peugeot has foresightedly pinched its tail because of the expected cost spiral of the duel with Audi, Porsche, Toyota and possibly Honda, because these big players could never be beaten in terms of budget alone. The rumor continues to this day that Peugeot sports director Jean Todt made the switch to the 3.5-liter regulations in 1988 at Mosley. The little French had an opulent budget cushion of almost 100 million marks. And if you have the most money, you have the best chance of benefiting from a change in regulations. After all, Todt had promised the Peugeot board a Le Mans victory.
In addition, everyone cooked his own soup. Bernie Ecclestone, for example, who was then FIA Vice President, was used as a guard for the relaunch of the World Cup. But the smart Brit was not interested in sports car racing eroding his Formula 1 world. His only interest in sports car racing was making as hearty a profit as possible. Ecclestone was responsible for the negotiations with the racetracks, for promotion and for the topic of television, and he was also supposed to clean up the chaotic paddock. The first thing he did was cancel guest and sponsor tickets, the teams had to pay for each chanterelle, and whoever invited sponsors could have them fed at F1 moon prices in the paddock club. Amazingly, no manufacturer should accept this generous offer.
Even so, the first season of the reformed World Cup in 1989 was still a success. Six works teams competed, Porsche returned half-heartedly, 18 teams had registered with 42 cars. But only FISA made money - the racetracks had to pay $ 600,000 to host a world championship run, and the teams received $ 3,000 per car and run, even if the race took place on the other side of the earth. FISA made $ 400,000 in profit per race after deduction of all costs, while the teams with no prize money put on the show on the track. The train was here on the wrong track at the latest.
Parallels between then and now
Time leap into 2011: At the ACO press conference in June 2011 the details of the new cooperationpresented between ACO and FIA to host the World Sports Car Championship from 2012. If you study the contract more closely, you will see one thing above all: The FIA is being rewarded princely for being able to win the World Cup. Up to two million euros flow into their coffers every year. Are the parallels between then and now pure coincidence?
In 1989 the front line between FISA (the motorsport department of the FIA) and ACO intensified very quickly: The French had the crown jewel in their treasure chest with the Le Mans 24h race, they insisted on their own television contracts and wanted to get together Don't let Ecclestone (or the FISA) undercut it. The ACO is a small French club that only has one race in mind, namely Le Mans. Many believe that the ACO has not given up this one-eyed approach to this day. The financial basis of the ACO is the success of the Le Mans race - and not a sports car world championship.
Even then, the ACO was stubborn: three weeks before the 24-hour race in 1989, the French announced that the classic would not count towards the World Cup after all. The decision was made primarily by the Japanese manufacturers, who considered the 24-hour race to be the center of sports car racing and only therefore committed to the world championship that they would be able to start at that myth-laden place. The French FISA President Balestre was no less stubborn and made one of his famous unfamiliar appearances at Le Mans in 1989 when he claimed at the press conference that 16 manufacturers were actively working on a 3.5-liter world engine. It would later turn out to be humbug.
Cracks in the wall of the sports car world championship
In 1990 the cracks were in the wall of the sports car -WM for the first time to see for everyone. The battle for big money annoyed more and more private teams, but the factories were also on the retreat: Aston Martin Racing withdrew under pressure from Ford, and Mazda no longer signed up for the world championship, because whoever missed a run should receive 250,000 dollars Shell out the penalty to the FISA. The starting field shrank to 33 cars and had to be spiced up for the first time with so-called local entries. In the meantime, the conflict between ACO and FISA continued to escalate: In the dispute over the homologation of the Le Mans racetrack, which had meanwhile been defused with chicanery, the 24h race in 1990 fell again from the World Championship standings. Jaguar took the second Le Mans victory, and ACO President Raymond Gouloumes unpacked the pipe of peace: “We want an understanding with FISA - but not at any price.” On September 18, 1990, FISA granted ACO its commercial rights to hold their 24h race in a five-year contract. In return, the ACO recognized the sporting sovereignty of FISA.
It was an ACO victory. The French club had given up no rights and made hardly any concessions. But it made me wonder back thenthe five-year contract: at the end of 1990 only one manufacturer, namely Peugeot, had finished a C1 prototype with a 3.5-liter engine. Where should all the other cars come from in order to hold a veritable sports car world championship in the future? FISA had to abandon its plan of only allowing cars with 3.5-liter world engines from 1991 - even if Mercedes, Jaguar and Toyota were working on new engines. The third year of the malaise over the new engines had an effect: in 1991 only 17 cars registered for the full season.
Even worse: Because the old cars were still needed to even get a starting field, a balance of the concepts had to be constructed. Today we call it the Balance of Performance, back then it was called the Handicap Regulations. The 3.5-liter cars drove at 750 kilos and without a consumption limit, the old Group C cars with 1000 kilos and a consumption limit. The dispute over the classifications - you inevitably feel reminded of today - escalated again at Le Mans: Mazda won because you could drive with less weight and without a consumption limit, Jaguar even withdrew cars in the dispute over the classifications. Only one 3.5-liter car saw the checkered flag at Le Mans in 1991.
Failure of the new 3.5-liter formula
The popular failure of the new 3.5-liter formula Liter formula resulted in fierce arguments that could hardly be surpassed in terms of bizarre. Jean-Marie Balestre fabulated at Le Mans in 1991 with the usual pomp that the Indy 500 race would now also rely on the new success formula of the 3.5-liter engines, and that by 1993 at least 17 different engines of this global type would be in circulation . When he was laughed at by the journalists for this statement, he made an all-round blow: It was only thanks to his drive that Le Mans still existed, without him the cars would still crawl along “the goat path of Le Mans”. And without him, the sports car world championship would still be dominated by one brand - namely Porsche.
The Le Mans organizer ACO immediately took the necessary steps and announced two days after the Le Mans race that it was withdrawing from the World Sports Car Championship. The tablecloth was cut. Max Mosley, who was to succeed Balestre on the FIA throne a little later, declared that the ACO was a gang of fraudsters who wanted to stab the FISA from behind and that they would never be forgiven for this outrage. At least Max Mosley was right: Under his aegis, there was silence between FIA and ACO for 20 long years. The last nail in the coffin was hammered in at a manufacturer and team meeting in London on November 11th: Bernie Ecclestone revealed to those present that FISA would only host the 1992 World Cup if they pay a $ 1.5 million registration fee per car.
During a break in a meetingEcclestone and Mosley left the discussion through a back door while the team representatives waited in a lounge for the meeting to continue. Two weeks later, Mercedes officially got out. The World Cup dragged itself through its final season in 1992, with eleven cars at the start in the first race in Monza. Only FISA made a mistake, collecting registration fees of $ 7.5 million from the Mazda, Peugeot and Toyota factory teams. The then Peugot sports director Jean Todt had achieved his goal: In June 1992 Derek Warwick, Yannick Dalmas and Mark Blundell took the Le Mans victory in a Peugeot 905 Evo 1B - just as Todt had once promised his board of directors.
World engine formula should break the neck of the World Cup
The price for the Peugeot victory was the reorientation towards the World engine formula - which should break the neck of the World Cup in the end. The history of the old sports car world championship certainly holds reminders for the start of the new sports car world championship, even if of course not all knowledge can be transferred seamlessly into the 21st century. But history provides clues: radical cures in technology regulations - whether world engine 1991 or energy-based regulations 2014 - are always critical. The regulator must ensure that costs remain under control. Otherwise, the manufacturers will quickly get rid of costs with the murderous argument.
Second, the World Cup must be on solid foundations on the host side. In 2012, the ACO intends to organize all races itself, with the exception of the season start in Sebring. Whether the ACO infrastructure is suitable for this seems at least questionable. And without a sustainable financial basis, the ACO will hardly be able to meet the high demands of the committed LMP manufacturers in terms of marketing, promotion and television broadcasting. In addition, a full starting field can only be achieved with the help of private teams - but they are hit hardest by the cost increases in a global racing series.
And thirdly, the fragile alliance between FIA and ACO is another predetermined breaking point in the new World Sports Car Championship. In the past, this cooperation often focused on questions of money, power wrangles and personal jealousy - and not motorsport.
